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April 03, 2008 01:11 AM UTC

Further thoughts on Shia Iraq

  • 12 Comments
  • by: RavenDawg

It’s about oil

I posted a few comments in response to Danny’s excellent summary of Iraqi Shiite factions last week, including the question of what were US objectives in going along with the attack by the Maliki government on the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al Sadr.  JO replied  with the perceptive question of why should the US pick a dog in this fight since both Sadrist and SIIC factions are strongly Iranian influenced.  

Fundamentally I think it comes down to picking which Shiite faction will most likely accommodate the core Bush Admin objective:  To capture and secure Iraqi oil resources through enduring US military presence in Iraq.  

It’s about oil

I posted a few comments in response to Danny’s excellent summary of Iraqi Shiite factions last week, including the question of what were US objectives in going along with the attack by the Maliki government on the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al Sadr.  JO replied  with the perceptive question of why should the US pick a dog in this fight since both Sadrist and SIIC factions are strongly Iranian influenced.  I had to mull on that for a while with the following results.

Fundamentally I think it comes down to picking which Shiite faction will most likely accommodate the core Bush Admin objective:  To capture and secure Iraqi oil resources through enduring US military presence in Iraq.  On the one hand, al Sadr is strongly nationalist, populist-based, and highly opportunistic.  His agenda for getting and keeping power does not necessarily include accepting a US master.  And we have painful experience with this personality combination from our previous dealings with Saddam Hussein.  On the other hand, Maliki, and through him SIIC, appear more willing to accept US dominance as a path to power.    

Because of the cumulative estrangement between the weak Maliki and al Sadr (his former supporter and perceived threat to US goals), it has become necessary to develop an alternate power alliance to sustain the Maliki government: ie, SIIC.  The timetable to October provincial elections in Iraq gave the impetus for action now.  These elections also serve a short term domestic political objective for Bush and the Republicans:  To convince US voters in advance of the Presidential elections that the US-backed Malicki govt has popular legitimacy, that democracy is taking hold in Iraq, the surge worked, vote for John McCain to finish the mission with honor-and keep those US forces in Iraq for the indefinite future.  When John McCain says he is OK with US troops in Iraq for 50 or 100 years, his real message is that he is OK with US troops in Iraq until every drop of oil is pumped out.  

So what about Iran?  Why should they go along with their proxies in SIIC allowing a US-dominated govt in Iraq?  First, as Danny notes, SIIC and Iran share very deep loyalties, even more than with al Sadr, so the Iranians are still in position to countervail against US initiatives.  Second, allowing sustained US involvement in Iraq weakens us economically and militarily, giving Iran latitude to pursue its agenda elsewhere in the mideast.  Third, Iran will enjoy the priceless irony of watching the blood of US grunts and the dollars of US taxpayers go toward oppression of their historic foes, the Iraqi Sunnis.  And you can bet that a percentage of revenues from Iraqi oil will find its way to support other Iranian proxies including Hezbollah and Hamas-makes Daddy Bush’s Iran-Contra scam look puny by comparison.  As far as US threat to invade Iran or attack their nuclear program, I believe Iran thinks the former is unlikely in the current climate (and they will be a much more formidable opponent than Saddam Hussein), and the latter exists already by US (or Israeli) air power independent of ground forces.      

Another prediction:  I think we will see an analogous power move by the Kurds to assume control of Kirkuk prior to the October provincial elections, with tacit support by US and Maliki govt.  So from the Bush Admin perspective, what we are looking at for the future Iraq is a puppet central govt propped up by US military occupation, de facto partition (and potentially de jure depending on provincial election outcomes), and keep that oil flowing to the US oil cartel.  Oh and too bad about the Sunnis, they’re on their own.

In the beginning, I couldn’t parse the nexus of oil, geopolitics, domestic power politics, and personal vendetta that was driving this whole Iraq adventure.  Five years later, I finally get it: It’s about oil.

Comments

12 thoughts on “Further thoughts on Shia Iraq

  1. …about having a place for a permanent U.S. military presence in the region to protect the flow of that oil.

    The story of Iraq started in Kuwait, which Saddam accused of stealing Iraqi oil by drilling at a slant. Invasion followed, after which came U.S. rescue of poor Kuwaitis. GHWB decided NOT to pursue Saddam’s army all the way to Baghdad, which seemed unnecessary. The U.S. had troops stationed in Saudi (for the first time) and was in no hurry to remove them.

    Meantime, in this corner… the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan left Osama bin Laden a man with a mission but without a country. His fundamentalist vision of a new caliphate didn’t sit well with most regimes in Muslim countries. From Afghanistan he moved to Somalia, where the strongman was experimenting with an Islamist state. Pressure by Clinton administration–not wishing to see bin Laden’s influence and ideas spread–succeeded in getting bin Laden evicted from Somalia, from whence he went back to Afghanistan where, in the meantime, the Taliban had taken power or at least had occupied Kabul.

    Bright idea occurs! Bin Laden, in danger of being sidelined in a remote, inaccessible country but dreaming of bringing about a new, fundamentalist global caliphate, seized upon the presence of infidel American troops in Islam’s holy homeland–Saudi–as a new marketing/recruiting tool for his envisioned global jihad. Bin Laden’s fundamental idea: easier to sell the idea of driving out the Americans than on a variety of local regimes. He quickly achieved some success: the Saudis asked the Americans to leave.

    Where then to put troops to ensure the steady flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, a peaceful environment around the Gulf, and uninterrupted oil production in the major fields? Iraq was the answer.

    This was Cheney’s strategic thinking, backed by Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz (he of “neoconservative” fame) and easily sold to Bush for whom “strategic thinking” was a mostly a foreign concept largely limited to his daily bicycle ride. It was Cheney’s re-run/correction of GHWB’s decision not to pursue Saddam’s army all the way to Baghdad (remembering that Cheney was defense secretary during the Kuwait war).

    This really is no particular mystery about this. And no real doubt about it!

    And it is something that needs to be taken into account in thinking about the future of American involvement in the region.

    1.    but we converged on the same conclusion.

      It is going to take a mesure of political courage for any US politician to challenge the fundamental assumptions of our geopolitical imperialism.  We’ll see how that goes.      

  2. .

    in any article that discusses the Sayyid Moktada al-Sadr by name,

    you must use his given name (given to him by the Bush Administration)

    “Firebrand” the first time he is mentioned.  

    I suppose in blogs it would be OK to substitute “hothead” or “mercurial” or “psychotic.”  

    …..

    and how come we don’t hear about the influence of Ayatullah Ali al-Sistani anymore ?  

    .

  3. BAGHDAD – More than 1,000 Iraqi soldiers and policemen either refused to fight or simply abandoned their posts during the inconclusive assault against Shiite militias in Basra last week, a senior Iraqi government official said Thursday. Iraqi military officials said the group included dozens of officers, including at least two senior field commanders in the battle.

    The desertions in the heat of a major battle cast fresh doubt on the effectiveness of the American-trained Iraqi security forces. The White House has conditioned further withdrawals of American troops on the readiness of the Iraqi military and police.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04

    1. Report on the desertions all over Iraq as entire units, rather than a handful of corrupt JAM cops here in Nasiriyah, or another station over there in Sadr City, and so on, as though it were really the primary outcome of the fighting.

      Clearly, it wasn’t.  Maybe reporters can report on the desertions and losses suffered by JAM.  

      Who do the people think won?  Well, I’ll give you a hint – the losing army doesn’t often have people flocking to join.

      1. in Iraq are you posted, Yokel? If we may know. Invaluable to have factual reporting from the scene to counter the conspiracies of the MSM, with their reporters distorting the facts from perches 10,000 miles away.

        1. But I’m home by now, fortunately.  I’ll admit the one place I didn’t get to was down in the south area.  I’m familiar enough to know that it’s a damn long way from Baghdad.  From that, my take is that to lead an army against an entrenched insurgency that far from the capital, in that large of a city, would be quite a feat in most of the third world, let alone Iraq.

          A source I like to check out is the Long War Journal.  They don’t drink the standard MSM kool-aid, but they’re honest.  (They have a decidedly different take on the Basra thing than the NYT has)  They send embeds, and back that up with sources from various Iraqi media organs and MNF-I, to come up with some pretty interesting and in-depth analysis.  Good stuff.

          1. Its three major financial backers.

            A DoD contractor who makes money off the Iraq war.

            A neo con millionaire backed charity that has John McCain on its board.

            And a charity that profiteers off of military families.

            http://www.charitywatch.org/ar

            Not a balanced source, but useful for getting a different perspective.

            1. That arch-conservative group called the Columbia Journalism Review wrote a rather glowing report on the New Journalism as carried out by the LWJ.

              It’s better journalism – true journalism – than the AP copy everywhere else.  Granted, the editorial take is pro-“We want to win this war,” but, once again, that’s more in line with American journalism pre-1968 than what the AP writes.  

              And it doesn’t limit the LWJ from pointing out issues with operations and strategies in a negative light.  Heck, I’d argue it gives them more credibility on that subject.  When they write “I’m afraid to say, we are lost,” there’s no question that they are afraid to say it, whereas if Reuters said the same thing (as they have repeatedly for 6 years), you’ve got to wonder if they’re afraid to say it at all.

      2.    According to Iraqi and Arab-language press via JuanCole.com (2 April, 4 April), the recent large scale recruitments by the Maliki govt are members of Badr Brigades and Da’wa militias, not deserting Sadrists.  That is, Maliki-SIIC faction is overtly gearing up for forceful suppression of al Sadr.

          Escalation of this conflict could have significant repercussions against US troops around the country, not to mention political reconciliation by the Iraqi govt.

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