SCOTUS reads Tenth Circuit riot act for rubber-stamping another Colo Dist Ct travesty....

24 thoughts on “SCOTUS reads Tenth Circuit riot act for rubber-stamping another Colo Dist Ct travesty….”

1. The bad ruling, and I agree it was a bad ruling, occurred in the FEDERAL district court that happens to sit in Colorado.  State judges were not involved.

   Unlike you, however, I don’t see one bad ruling by a judge that is reversed on appeal by other judges as evidence of a vast judicial conspiracy.

   Log in to Reply

   1. Cuervo: The bad ruling, and I agree it was a bad ruling, occurred in the FEDERAL district court that happens to sit in Colorado.  State judges were not involved.

      Unlike you, however, I don’t see one bad ruling by a judge that is reversed on appeal by other judges as evidence of a vast judicial conspiracy.

      No, but the fourteen substantially identical cases I cited do constitute credible evidence of a pattern of wrongdoing.  That this sort of thing falls through the Tenth Circuit ‘cracks’ as a matter of course — and the same is almost certainly substantially true in Colorado appellate courts, but non-publication keeps this fact from public view — is problematic.

      But let’s start adding up these bad rulings.  First, there was the ruling by Judge Habas that you praised at the outset — it took me five minutes to see it for the travesty it was — and now, there’s this one?  Our judicial work product is nothing short of atrocious, and if the only way we can force judges to do a better job is through the specter of tort liability, then it is something we will have to impose.

      Log in to Reply

2. although, I’m not sure one would properly describe the problem as “Pro se litigants are systematically discriminated against in Colorado District Court, being held to a far higher standard than ordinary litigants.”

   The bigger problem is that while pro se litigants are supposed to be held to a lower standard, as noted by SCOTUS, that they are frequently held to the same standard as lawyers, and most are both not lawyers and generally weren’t even stellar at researching and writing (which is much of what lawyers do) in high school from which many didn’t even graduate.

   The prison litigation reform act and some other federal habeas corpus laws impose exacting standards on prisoners who want to bring suit to challenge their convictions or their prison conditions.  These standards were intentionally set excessively high by Congress. 

   While it doesn’t help when courts, like those in this case, get overzealous, the bigger problem is that lots of the cases brought are both subject to very high statutory standards and are not meritorious (in part because even unrepresented prisoners who have valid claims aren’t able to articulate the really relevant points well).  So, magistrates get in the habit of looking for the easiest way to dismiss the cases and get jaded about their merits.

   The most common grounds for dismissal include things like failure to exhaust other remedies, something that is simply due to a lack of knowledge of court rules.  Strict statutes of limitations also apply.  Often complaints that get heard do so simply because a prisoner had the dumb luck to get the process right without actually knowing what the rules that applied were. 

   Log in to Reply

   1. Check out the affidavit of Shell, which claims that Magistrate Watanabe (formerly a Colorado District Judge) allegedly told her that, “Pro se litigants NEVER win in this court.” Id. at В¶ 22 (on p. 20 of 22).

      I might also add that this case, hereinabove, was used on that same day in a Citation of Supplemental Authority in yet another case, where similar practices had taken place.

      Log in to Reply

      1. Also, pushing for more respect for pro se litigants, who often do, in good faith, do ill advised things in litigation, isn’t a good path to solutions.  A fair shake from a judge isn’t worth much when you still don’t know what you’re doing.

         It would be better to put efforts into securing representation for meritorious cases, where the stakes are high, but not monetary.

         Log in to Reply

         1. I appreciate the wisdom in your comment, but see my comment to your other post and, perhaps, you’ll understand why I cannot agree.  You can argue that strategically, that litigant should have bifurcated his claims or elected not to sue certain defendants but, procedurally he didn’t do anything wrong and his legal arguments were excellent and accurate.  I’d like to ask, “How is it possible this could happen?” but, the problem is, it’s happening all the time.  The case that Rio highlighted in this diary is but one example.

            The argument that pro se folks are usually or mostly incompetent at litigation (which is true), is being used as a pretext for dismissing out-of-hand virtually every single pleading that comes along.  One of my better Denver attorney friends, now retired and –herself– a good friend of Jean Dubofsky, admitted that she retired because she became disillusioned with the legal profession in Colorado.  She said that judges all too often make a predetermination very early on in the case and then rule against one party (or for the other) just for the sake of ruling against that party.  I have experienced that first hand.  I may as well wipe my ass and submit that piece of toilet-paper, because the motions & briefs I’ve submitted get the same treatment, not matter what’s in them.

            Log in to Reply

         2. As always, the proof is in the pudding.  Since January 1, 2006 (ignoring cases where no objections were filed), Judge Blackburn adopted the recommendations of his magistrate eleven times.  In every instance, the plaintiff was proceeding pro se.  Every opinion was substantially the same.  More importantly for purposes of the Due Process Clause, the official record is completely devoid of any evidence that Judge Blackburn ever even read the objections filed by pro se plaintiffs in these cases. Shell v. Devries, No. 06-cv-00318-REB-BNB (D.Colo. Jan. 30, 2007); Gallegos v. ACE Express – Coach USA, No. 06-cv-00408-REB-BNB (D.Colo. Jan. 19, 2007); Automated Lending, Inc. v. Ransom, No. 05-cv-02487-REB-MEH (D.Colo. Nov. 30, 2006); Signer v. Pimkova, No. 05-cv-02039-REB-MJW (D.Colo. Nov. 30, 2006); Baldauf v. Garoutte, No. 03-RB-01104 (D.Colo. Jul. 20, 2006); Williams v. United States Forest Service, No. 05-cv-01277-REB-BNB (D.Colo. Jun. 27, 2006); Martin v. Directors Guild of America, No. 06-cv-00609-REB-MJW (D.Colo. May 16, 2006); Baldauf v. Hyatt, No. 01-cv-01315-REB-CBS (D.Colo. Feb. 08, 2006); Calvert v. Safranek, No. 05-cv-001713-REB-PAC (D.Colo. Jan. 30, 2006); Lawton v. Center Stock Company, LLC, No. 06-cv-01125-REB-MEH (D.Colo. Jan. 19, 2006); Stetzel v. Attorney General of the State of Colorado, No. 04-cv-01531-REB-BNB (D.Colo. Jan. 3, 2006) (all Versuslaw).  See also, e.g., Smith v. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 04-RB-1222 (D.Colo. Oct. 15, 2004); Gambina v. Hood, 05-cv-793-REB-BNB (D.Colo. Nov. 2, 2005).

            I also have the advantage of having read Shell’s brief to the Court. Now, if there was credible evidence to contradict what Shell was claiming, I would be inclined to discount her claims.  However, the evidence corroborates her claim, and it is therefore obvious that she is telling the truth.

            Log in to Reply

   2. Pro se cases are handled differently, whether the plaintiff is an attorney with thirty years’ experience, a law school grad, a law student like Tilt, or an MIT-educated and self-taught citizen like Kay Sieverding.  This is just fact, established by considerable evidence.  Those who file in propria persona are systematically discriminated against.

      Log in to Reply

      1. both make absolutely off the wall arguments in their legal filings.  I’ve read them.  At length.  I’ve also read the pleadings of the law student fighting the mental health evalution requirement and with it the unpublished opinion standards of Colorado’s state and federal courts, and the very hard case of an individual whose divorce went very badly and who therefore tried to seek redress in federal court.

         They aren’t systematically discriminated against.  They simply aren’t willing to accept the law as it is, rather than as they would like it to be.  Their legal arguments are really, really bad, so they lose.

         I’ve also read quite a few of the court decisions addressing those cases, and those court decisions are mostly respectful, legally accurate and patient, although a few get a bit frustated.

         Not to put too fine a point on it (and by sue in this case, I mean sue for money damages in most cases): You can’t sue judges.  You can’t sue people who work for judges.  You can’t sue prosecutors.  You can’t sue judicial discipline officials.  You can’t sue attorney discipline officials.  You can’t sue elected officials for passing bad laws or failing to pass good laws.  You can’t sue the bar associations for the conduct of bar association attorneys.  You can’t sue a state government in federal court.  You can’t sue private attorneys for civil rights violations.  As a general rule, you can’t sue anyone for civil rights violations for things that happen in state court proceedings, with the possible exception of a bailiff who illegally roughs you up. 

         If you want to sue a local government for anything other than an intentional civil rights violation, or you want to sue the state, you generally have to do so in state court if you live in the state, and you have to jump through the hoops of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, and are subject to a damages cap, and a very short list of permissible lawsuits.

         Civil rights suits for discriminatory enforcement of laws on the books almost always fail.  So do suits alleging cruel and unusual punishment.

         You can’t sue insurance companies for the misconduct of their insureds, as a general rule, unless the insureds are dead and died leaving no meaningful probate estate.  You generally can’t sue shareholders for the misdeeds of the corporations they own.

         You can’t sue someone for adultery or breaking up your marriage.  You can’t raise infidelity in a divorce except in so far as it relates to a child.

         Almost nothing in a probate case or divorce case can be litigated in federal court.

         In almost every case, once you lose on an issue in any civil case, state or federal, you can’t litigate that issue again in any other civil case in any state or federal forum.

         Courts are potentially powerful and positive contributors to a just society.  But, they can’t do everything.

         Log in to Reply

         1. Nice try, Andrew.  You’ve already admitted on a different forum that you troll the forums to take up for the legal profession (“I often defend the system in public against what I see as attacks [on the legal system]”).  Like the courts, you are using the fact that most (but not all) pro se pleadings are inept as a pretext for dismissing out-of-hand them all.

            In fact, like the judges involved here, you didn’t read the pleadings, either (`though you claimed to have).  If you had, you would not have stated that the lawsuit allegedly arising from the “unfortunate divorce” (rather than from transactions that were collateral to the suit) was a suit for money damages against attorney regulation counsel or judge’s clerk or whomever.  Those were ex parte Young claims (for prospective, injunctive relief), period.  Are you now going to say ex parte Young is dead?  You also claim that these fools just don’t accept the law.  Bullshit.  The law (Supreme Court and circuit court case law) provides that:

            you can sue someone for money damages, who hides a child from you, notwithstanding that you were also involved in divorce proceedings (just look at Hall v. Hall-Stradley right here in Denver -$60K against the custodial mother;¹ $200K against the attorney co-conspirator);

             

            if you file a request for reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA, that the state entity must respond and, if it doesn’t, you have a cause of action;

             

            if you are discriminated against based upon a religious animus or a class-of-one, you can sue under 1985(3);

             

            if you complain about ADA discrimination and you are retaliated against, you can sue under Title II of the ADA, even if you’re not a qualified person under the ADA;

             

            if someone breaches a contract in bad faith, you have a contractual cause of action against them;

             

            if someone violates the Consumer Protection Act, you have a statutory cause of action against them; and

            when an agency violates procedural rules, you may have a cause of action against the agency in the nature of a “procedural injury,” notwithstanding the usual standing requirements of immediacy and redressability.

            In your post, you stated that these, “court decisions are mostly respectful, legally accurate and patient.”  How nice of you to take up for these unfortunate, overworked judges (paid $165K per year for life), who have to deal with these annoying pro se fools.  However, in the case I’m referring to, if it had been a reasoned (published) decision, it would have set new precedent, including the following:

              courts are now once again allowed to engage in exercising hypothetical jurisdiction;

              a state entity is no longer required to answer or respond to a request for reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act;

              a litigant, who was once a party to a divorce action at one time, may not file a contract or tort claim against any person for any reason, if that person was an opposing party in the divorce action;

              Rooker-Feldman may now be used for temporary restraining orders, where the merits of the case had never been “actually decided,”

              Rooker-Feldman may now be used to preclude cases brought by state court winners, as well as state court losers;

              a divorce case is considered pending for the purposes of Younger, even if the case has been “suspended” for over two years, thereby putting the litigant out of court;

              only a religious based animus is a valid bases for claims under 42 U.S. В§1985(3);

              a complaint regarding retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act is no longer subject to a separate inquiry; and

              a pro se litigant, who was once a party to a divorce proceeding, has no right to enforce contract or consumer protection act claims against a child and family investigator, who breached a contract in bad faith.

              a case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may now be dismissed with prejudice;

              a judge may characterize the case as frivolous and vexatious (i.e.,rule on the merits of a case) that was just dismissed for want of jurisdiction and; and

              under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. В§ 636, an article III judge no longer needs to consider the objections to the recommendations of a U.S. magistrate judge.

            Is this what you characterize as “legally accurate?”

            Andrew, if you had reviewed the pleadings of that particular case, as you said you did, you also would have known that he fully complied with the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA)and that his claims fell into the very narrow crack where the Eleventh Amendment Immunity does not apply.  You would also have known that his claims were not previously litigated and, therefore, no preclusion doctrines were applicable. Finally, you sure as hell can’t say that his legal arguments were really, really bad, because many of his legal arguments were lifted right out of pleadings, briefs and treatises filed by the D.o.J., Erwin Chemerinsky, Martin Redish, et al.

            The fact is, the federal court wasn’t going to allow him to move forward with his case regardless of what hurdles he overcame and regardless of what the law says.  With most other pro se fools, it’s easy to trip them up on the CGIA or Eleventh Amendment Immunity or absolute immunity or prosecutorial immunity or Rooker-Feldman or Younger, Burford or Colorado River abstention doctrines. In this case, however, that proved unworkable, so they just dismissed it under the because-I-said-so doctrine.

            The fact is, you’re not being honest here.  There most certainly is an institutional bias against pro se litigants and against anyone who goes up “Town Hall,” irrespective of the binding precedents that  would permit. The fact is, “Cutting-edge civil rights arguments . . . often lose for two reasons; becuase they are cutting-edge and because they are civil rights arguments. This does not, however, mean that they were frivolous. There is already a disturbing tendency among federal judges to sanction civil rights plaintiffs in disproportionate numbers on the grounds that their claims are frivolous.”  David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton Univ. Press, 1988) at 274, n.10.  And see Bloom & Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 Notre Dame
            J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 475, 483-84 (2002); Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 659; Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, Benjamin Barton Do Judges Systemically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession.

            In conclusion, this wasn’t a matter of the pro se folks being unable to accept the law.  This is a case of the judges being unable to accept and apply the law to the facts of this case, and so they address all the conclusions-of-law under a purely deferential standard (thereby avoiding discussion of it) and dismiss it without any reasoning, which is called the because-I-said-so legal doctrine.  You’re taking up the cause against these people, because you want to perpetuate and solidify the need for your profession, not to mention the fact that you can’t publicly criticize any judiciary that you might risk having to practice before.

            ¹Because the case against the mother and her attorney may still be pursued in state court, father is looking for counsel in Denver to prosecute the case in Denver District Court. See here for more. 

            Log in to Reply

            1. You say this about “Andrew”:

               “You’ve already admitted on a different forum that you troll the forums to take up for the legal profession (“I often defend the system in public against what I see as attacks [on the legal system]”).”

               So what?  Is that supposed to be a bad thing?  You “troll” the web doing the exact opposite of what Andrew allegedly does.  Are we, therefore, supposed to dismiss your writings out of hand?  I don’t understand why you started your post in that way.

               Log in to Reply

               1. My problem with both of you is that all of your arguments are essentially ad hominem (mostly, circumstantial), and you have utterly ignored and willfully misrepresented the facts of the cases in question toward a dishonest end.

                  If Andy wants to defend the decisions, let him do so with due regard to arguments being presented by the other side, instead of willfully ignoring them — as you have so assiduously done.

                  Log in to Reply

                  1. Poor baby.

                     Log in to Reply

               2. I didn’t say that he’s a bad guy, because he’s taking up for the legal profession (that you me and he are in) or the judiciary. I was pointing out that he has an ulterior motive behind his postings, which are tied together by a common thread. It’s an observation that’s poignant in the discussion, not an attack.

                  “The problem is not that too many lawyers are publicly criticizing judges. Unfortunately, too few lawyers are willing to do so, even when a judge has committed serious ethical violations and should be held accountable.”

                    Monroe H.Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of Judges—A Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 729, 729 (1997).

                  Log in to Reply

                  1. You’ve identified his rather obvious, and possibly only, motive:  to defend these courts against unfounded attacks.  But, perhaps we are discussing only semantics.

                     Anyway, to give a complete picture (more complete than the partial picture you’ve created by quoting Freedman – whoever he is), you should also quote from an attorney’s ethical duties.  Comment 3 to Rule 8.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct explains that:

                     “To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional  efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly
                     criticized.”

                     http://www.colorados…

                     So, Andrew appears to be performing his ethical duty, in my opinion.

                     Log in to Reply

                     1.   . . . which has the potential of being more hastily applied against attorneys (than most of the other rules), whereas the other Rules of Professional Conduct (esp. conduct towards opposing party or third-parties) are disregrded. Rule 8.3 also requires attorneys to report misconduct that they become aware of, which never happens, because the “Golden [unwritten] Rule” applies, which is that you never rat out another in your profession.  Rule 8.4(c)-(d) also proscribes lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; or engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.  But neither of those are enforced either. So, please don’t pontificate to me about the selective application of the illusory Rules of Professional Conduct in Colorado.

                        Moreover, since you’re in an argumentative mood, today, your assertion is based entirely on the presumption that he’s defending “unfounded attacks.”  They may be ill-advised attacks, unpopular attacks, untimely attacks or even subjective attacks, but they are neither unfounded nor conclusory.  I spare no references to the actual documents, citations and authorities in my posts.  I don’t spew a bunch of emotional, unsupported, scurrilous claims.

                        And, if you’re in the legal profession, you sure as hell know, who “Freedman” is.  Probably a fifth of your law school books were authored by him.

                        Bottom line is, both you and Andrew are entitled to your opinions.  You’re entitled to say that my so-called attacks are “meritless,” “unavailing,” “unpersuasive,” “scurrilous,” “spurious,” or whatever.  But they sure as shit aren’t unfounded or unsupported.  Until you’ve been on my side of the fence, for a change, I doubt you’ll be particularly receptive to any of my assertions, regardless of the probative value of any evidence I have to offer and irrespective of whether legal scholars, law professors or other attorneys agree with some or all of my assertions.

                        Log in to Reply

                        1. That’s rich!  Accusing OTHERS of pontificating to you in the midst of another finger-wagging, 1000-word post of yours!

                           I simply quoted a rule that I think is important, as are the rules you cite.  I didn’t argue that any should be “selectively applied.” 

                           As for Freedman, I know he didn’t author a “fifth” of my law school books, since, according to his bio, he’s not written nearly that many.  (http://law.hofstra.e…)

                           I know that he didn’t write either my contracts textbook or my legal ethics textbook, which are the only textbooks he appears to have written.  But, he has published textbooks, I grant you that.  I guess whether one reads them may depend on what law school one attends.  So, if you don’t mind a little of your own advice, you shouldn’t pontificate about my “law school books.” 

                           Oh, how many “legal scholars, law professors, or other attorneys” have opined on your specific situation?  Has Freedman reviewed your case in depth and announced his agreement with “some or all of your assertions” about your situation?  Don’t you think it’s rather presumptuous to claim support for your assertions by quoting publications that have nothing to do with the specific facts of your situation?  Virtually anybody can generically quote sources that “agree with some or all of [his/her] assertions.”  But that doesn’t say anything about your case.

                           I’m sorry I’m being “argumentative” today, which apparently means that I’m responding in the same tone and detail that you routinely use, but my lunch meeting was cancelled, so I had more time.  I’ll leave you alone now.

                           Log in to Reply

                           1. Seriously?  You know I’m not going to get dragged into an ad hominem flame war.  You think I’m a whiner and I think the legal ethics system needs reform.  A few legal scholars adopt your position that the status quo is not only fine, but that it works well most of the time; that it works as well as anybody could’ve dreamed; and that it’s the best system in the world.¹  Many more legal scholars and even our former CBA Pres. (don’t know about our present) agree with me [that we to clean up our act].

                              ¹  If I’m putting words in your mouth, I apologize in advance.

                           2. I never eat cornflakes. 

                              Look, I’m sorry to piss you off, and I don’t believe the status quo is perfect.  But neither is it cause for a holy war.  The Kays and Kenneths of the world strongly support my view that some people will always bitch about judges, no matter how frivolous or insane their complaints are.  So, we can’t try to please them. 

                           3. I can do finger-wagging, 1,000-word posts  –we’re in a diary sidebar!

                           4. …but, then, you can’t complain about pontificating either!

                     2. Remember Rule 1.1?

                        Abraham Lincoln once observed that it is “better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak out and remove all doubt.”  If Andrew is acting out of some professional obligation here (an assertion I will accept arguendo), he has a concomitant obligation to adequately inform himself before he opens his pie-hole.  As is the case with you, if you are a lawyer, I might add.

                        And then, there is that pesky obligation under Rule 8.4(c) to not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  If Andrew is even half-way competent, he knows that what he has said here with respect to my appeal constitutes a material misrepresentation.  Add that to Tilt’s comments regarding Rule 8.3, and in theory, Andy would be in one world of hurt.

                        In the real world, lawyers are expected to perform fellatio on our judges, even when it isn’t asked for.  Dan Caplis has said on the air that he would never criticize a judge before whom he might appear, and that is pretty much the norm (as attorneys have been disciplined for their candor).  Lawyers have become a sorry legion of craven invertebrates who, as a species, have abandoned principled advocacy in favor of shameful servitude.  And when you treat someone as though he is omniscient for long enough, he might begin to believe his own press clippings.  Professor Carl Bogus wryly observes:

                        Some people are more vulnerable to a lack of criticism than others, and among the most vulnerable are judges.  … Saying that lawyers treat the judges with deference failes to capture the interaction; it is more accurate to say that lawyers bow and scrape.  Some lawyers have elevated fawning to an art form, pulling it off with subtle elegance.  But few tell a judge she is wrong.

                        Carl T. Bogus, “Culture of Quiescence,” 9 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 351, 352 (2004).

                        You really ought to get yourself up to speed if you aspire to commenting intelligently; while not knowing who Professor Freedman is can be excused, not knowing who Karl Llewellyn is means that you basically slept through most of law school.  Have either of you read Anastasoff?  It spawned scores of law review articles, and Andy’s bizarre comment on unpublished opinions displayed the kind of abject ignorance one would never expect to see in an accomplished appellate lawyer.  If you had criticizes from a position of minimal knowledge instead of attacking me ad hominem out of a rabid abundance of ignorance right out of the box, I would have been far less hostile in my responses. 

                        Log in to Reply

         2. You’ve already proven that you don’t know the first [expletive deleted] thing about either case, and admitted elsewhere that you are a paid whore with a private agenda.  And you are doing your streetwalking here for a reason which can only be presumed nefarious.

            While I’m not so certain that you can’t sue judges for willful misconduct on the bench (it is in violation of jus cogens international law, as evidenced by the ICCPR see Art. II at, requiring state liability for human rights violations committed by government officials), I am certain that violations of the Due Process Clause are actionable even in the absence of damages, Carey v. Piphus, and judges can be held liable in tort for actions not taken in a judicial capacity (such as supervision of direct subordinates, Forrester v. White). 

            If this is emblematic of the kind of slipshod preparation you do when representing clients, your malpractice insurer should be duly advised.

            Log in to Reply

         3. “Kay Sieverding and Suzanne Shell
            both make absolutely off the wall arguments in their legal filings.  I’ve read them.  At length. “

              Then you must have read where I stated Judge Blackburn should have recused himself from my copyright infringement case (Shell v. DeVries) because he was a wintess to the facts in this case by virtue of presiding over the prior case where the infringing conduct occurred. Funny, he didn’t mention that part in his denial of my motion to reconsider.

              And what about copyright infringement cases? Could one ask for more objective, measurable, and identifable proof that certain U.S. District Court Judges / Magistrate Judges are NOT fair and objective when applying the facts and law than the following example:

              I had two copyright infringement / breach of contract cases with materially identical facts, one with Internet Archive and the other naming two Colorado attorneys as defendants. The language in both complaints was materially the same. My pleadings on the respective motions to dismiss were materially the same. *I* was the same. The infringing / breaching parties were different. The judges were different. I survived the motion to dismiss against the non-profit and lost the other against the Colorado attorneys.

              What can we infer from this?  That Colorado attorneys are more protected from civil liability when they wilfully and knowingly infringe a copyright and breach contractual terms than a non-profit who commits the very same infringing and breach of contract acts using a non-sentient web spider? That some judges are not objective and fair when applying identical facts and law? That I am or am not off the wall, depending on which judge hears my case or which lawyer reads my pleadings?  Or is it just me. . . that the laws and the courts don’t serve to protect *me* and the facts are irrelevant simply because I am a controversial political activist? Or pro se?

              Like another on this list, I, too, peformed an audit of cases in the U. S. District Court, Colorado. I focused on all 246 copyright cases filed since 2000. Since 2000, NO PLAINTIFF has ever been sanctioned with attorney fees on motion to dismiss a copyright case, except me – by Judge Blackburn. In fact, Judge Blackburn has not deviated from a magistrate judge’s recommendation, except for my case. No first request for an extension of time to file has been denied (in fact as many as 5 have been granted to a single party) except for me. My case is the ONLY one where the copyright infringement claims were dismissed and the remaining claims were NOT remanded to a state court.

              I’ve been treated entirely different by different judges on copyright cases that are based on the same facts and law. I’ll provide my table showing the copyright case audit results to knowyourcourts.com for publication. . .and let the reader arrive at his or her own conclusions.

            Log in to Reply