It’s about oil
I posted a few comments in response to Danny’s excellent summary of Iraqi Shiite factions last week, including the question of what were US objectives in going along with the attack by the Maliki government on the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al Sadr. JO replied with the perceptive question of why should the US pick a dog in this fight since both Sadrist and SIIC factions are strongly Iranian influenced.
Fundamentally I think it comes down to picking which Shiite faction will most likely accommodate the core Bush Admin objective: To capture and secure Iraqi oil resources through enduring US military presence in Iraq.
It’s about oil
I posted a few comments in response to Danny’s excellent summary of Iraqi Shiite factions last week, including the question of what were US objectives in going along with the attack by the Maliki government on the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al Sadr. JO replied with the perceptive question of why should the US pick a dog in this fight since both Sadrist and SIIC factions are strongly Iranian influenced. I had to mull on that for a while with the following results.
Fundamentally I think it comes down to picking which Shiite faction will most likely accommodate the core Bush Admin objective: To capture and secure Iraqi oil resources through enduring US military presence in Iraq. On the one hand, al Sadr is strongly nationalist, populist-based, and highly opportunistic. His agenda for getting and keeping power does not necessarily include accepting a US master. And we have painful experience with this personality combination from our previous dealings with Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, Maliki, and through him SIIC, appear more willing to accept US dominance as a path to power.
Because of the cumulative estrangement between the weak Maliki and al Sadr (his former supporter and perceived threat to US goals), it has become necessary to develop an alternate power alliance to sustain the Maliki government: ie, SIIC. The timetable to October provincial elections in Iraq gave the impetus for action now. These elections also serve a short term domestic political objective for Bush and the Republicans: To convince US voters in advance of the Presidential elections that the US-backed Malicki govt has popular legitimacy, that democracy is taking hold in Iraq, the surge worked, vote for John McCain to finish the mission with honor-and keep those US forces in Iraq for the indefinite future. When John McCain says he is OK with US troops in Iraq for 50 or 100 years, his real message is that he is OK with US troops in Iraq until every drop of oil is pumped out.
So what about Iran? Why should they go along with their proxies in SIIC allowing a US-dominated govt in Iraq? First, as Danny notes, SIIC and Iran share very deep loyalties, even more than with al Sadr, so the Iranians are still in position to countervail against US initiatives. Second, allowing sustained US involvement in Iraq weakens us economically and militarily, giving Iran latitude to pursue its agenda elsewhere in the mideast. Third, Iran will enjoy the priceless irony of watching the blood of US grunts and the dollars of US taxpayers go toward oppression of their historic foes, the Iraqi Sunnis. And you can bet that a percentage of revenues from Iraqi oil will find its way to support other Iranian proxies including Hezbollah and Hamas-makes Daddy Bush’s Iran-Contra scam look puny by comparison. As far as US threat to invade Iran or attack their nuclear program, I believe Iran thinks the former is unlikely in the current climate (and they will be a much more formidable opponent than Saddam Hussein), and the latter exists already by US (or Israeli) air power independent of ground forces.
Another prediction: I think we will see an analogous power move by the Kurds to assume control of Kirkuk prior to the October provincial elections, with tacit support by US and Maliki govt. So from the Bush Admin perspective, what we are looking at for the future Iraq is a puppet central govt propped up by US military occupation, de facto partition (and potentially de jure depending on provincial election outcomes), and keep that oil flowing to the US oil cartel. Oh and too bad about the Sunnis, they’re on their own.
In the beginning, I couldn’t parse the nexus of oil, geopolitics, domestic power politics, and personal vendetta that was driving this whole Iraq adventure. Five years later, I finally get it: It’s about oil.
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