12 thoughts on “Afghan troop “Surge” predictions”

1. Thomas Friedman in today’s NYT focuses on the role, and number, of consultants used in both Afghanistan and Iraq ( http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11… )

   For one thing, these consultants are almost surely not hunting down Al Qaeda, our original official goal in Afghanistan. Their number raises the question of whether it’s appropriate for the U.S. to engage in “nation building,” whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere else!

   Before evaluating how many troops we need, I’d like to see Obama reevaluate our mission. That’s not a military question.

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2. What is the US goal?
   
   What are our military objectives?
   
   In what time frame do we want to accomplish them?
   
   How large are the enemy forces?
   
   What kind of resistance is probable?

   Said another way –

   The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.  What vital nation interests are involved in AfPak?

   U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.  Describe victory.

   U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.  what are those objectives?

   The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Likewsie, risks and costs should be fully and frankly analyzed and reassessed continually.
   
   I believe that’s what the Obama administration is doing now. (A good thing)

   U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a “reasonable assurance” of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress. Is it present? Why? For how much longer?

   Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? Was there ever? What was it? Is it still plausible?

   Have the consequences of our actions been fully considered?
   

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   1. The seldom mentioned key factor: time expired already. IF we had a plausible set of objectives, clearly stated, and were willing to commit the required resources to meet them, AND IF we were at the beginning, that would be one question.

      But obviously we’re not at the beginning, and eight years going into the ninth is a long time for a war. I strongly suspect that it’s too late for anyone, Obama included, to start from scratch in terms of public perception.

      Conclusion: Keeping the Taliban at bay long enough to progress with “nation building” to a self-sustaining state is highly unlikely, given the minimum number of years this is likely to take. Eight? Nine? Well, we’ve already spent that time and we won’t get it back. And with Karzai’s shenanigans, it doesn’t strike me as likely that we’ll even get started anytime soon.

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      1. “Keeping the Taliban at bay long enough to progress with “nation building” to a self-sustaining state…”

         Is that really our goal?
         
         Really? Seriously- c’mon. No one in the national command authority ever said that as far as I know. Though, they may have, they don’t always let me know whatthehell they’re thinking.

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         1. 1. Dexter Filkins, NYT: “McChrystal’s plan is a blueprint for an extensive American commitment to build a modern state in Afghanistan, where one has never existed.” [Stanley McChrystal’s Long War,” NYT Magazine, Oct. 14. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10…

            2. From McChrystal’s Aug. 30 assessment delivered to Obama (full text at http://media.washingtonpost.co… ):

            “Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces. Our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort… Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people’s choices and needs….

            …

            2. Prioritize responsive and accountable governance. We must assist in improving governance at all levels through both formal and traditional mechanisms.

            Is “improving governance at all levels” reasonably described as “nation building”? The latter is a phrase widely used to describe McChrystal’s underlying message: that to defeat the Taliban, we must build an effective Afghan National Security Force and “effective governance at all levels.” See, for example, WashPost, Sep. 22 ( http://www.washingtonpost.com/… ):
            

            “Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s grim assessment of the Afghanistan war has opened a divide between the military, which is pushing for an early decision to send more troops, and civilian policymakers who are increasingly doubtful of an escalating nation-building effort.”
            

            For more on this topic, see Army Field Manual 3-24, David Petreus’s 2006 screed on counter-insurgency warfare, adopted as policy–and how it differs from conventional warfare. A copy is at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/…

            “Nation building” is at the heart of counter-insurgency warfare; whether we can, or should try, to accomplish this in Afghanistan lies at the heart of Obama’s decision on how to proceed from here. Whatever his answer to McChrystal’s request, that will be the new policy, Obama’s policy–not Bush’s–and will make events thereafter Obama’s. And it is the reason I’ve been ranting about the importance of the botched Afghan presidential election–for Afghanistan, for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, for the Obama administration, and for Democrats everywhere running in 2010 on the strength of Obama’s endorsement.

            Now, back to the Loveland city council…

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            1. I haven’t been keeping up.

               We gotta
               
               a) set a clear objective that has measurable military goals
               
               b) staff to meet same
               
               c) achieve that objective

               If we can’t commit to all three- we should come home.

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3. .
   
   http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11…

   http://gazettephoto.mycapture….
   
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   1. .
      
      http://www.washingtonpost.com/…
      
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4. .
   
   http://www.washingtonpost.com/…

   is this a sign of leaning too heavily on the force ?  I don’t mean the ash & trash, folks who don’t go out on patrol.  Fort Carson gives El Paso County the highest child abuse, spouse abuse and suicide rates in the state.  
   
   A combat soldier today sees about 4 to 6 times as much action in a 12-month tour as a soldier would have seen in the Battle of the Bulge in WW II.  
   
   .

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   1. I think what we’re going to find out is this guy was/is a domestic terrorist acting on his own. A nut job- yes. A enemy sympathizer- yes. A criminal- yes.  

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   2. I wonder–and this is a question, not an opinion posing as a rhetorical inquiry–whether we should reconsider the role of World War II in the current context.

      WWII helped define what is meant by “masculinity” in American society these many years later. The American Man is tough as nails, doesn’t complain, keeps going, undertakes the impossible, and no “sissified” mental “weakness” admitted or allowed.

      I’m fascinated by Barron’s last observation: AfPak = 4 to 6 X the level of combat action as in WWII’s toughest battle (or one of its toughest). What does that mean, exactly? But–here’s my question–could it be that within the military community, now largely segregated from the general population as a result of the end of the draft, there exists a set of ingrained if seldom articulated attitudes that lead to unforeseen consequences, not just in extreme cases like Fort Hood, but also in much quieter cases like spouse and child abuse? One of those attitudes is “can do, no matter what” and it operates from the very top (“Yes, Mr. President, we’ll undertake any and all missions you request”) to the level of individual soldiers asked to perform beyond the limits of anyone’s endurance.

      I suspect that we have not really dealt with the full implications of the “professional army” (misnamed the All Volunteer Force). Or worse, that we are dealing with this issue on the level of individual therapy for PTSD where the underlying problem goes much deeper.

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