April 13, 2009 12:35 AM UTC
Afghanistan
29 Comments- by: Jared Polis
( – promoted by Colorado Pols)
I wrote this two days ago, but wasn’t able to post it until now. I am now back home in Colorado:
Afghanistan
We just landed in United Arab Emirates. Sorry I’ve been slow to reply on my Iraq posts, but it was because I was in Afghanistan the last two and half days. I wasn’t allowed to announce it ahead of time but now that I am back on “friendly” soil I can share my experiences as part of a Congressional Delegation visit to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan
We visited two cities in Afghanistan, Kabul the capital and Kandahar in the south near the Pakistani border. What a mess. What another world. No one can make sense of Afghanistan because it doesn’t really make sense.
We hardly glimpsed the real Afghanistan. Through the bullet-proof windows of our van, we saw a few children playing, women in Burkhas, and men going about their daily business as we drove from the airport to the Embassy, but our briefings were all in military bases or government buildings.
I grew up loving Afghan food. My parents befriended an Afghani immigrant in the early 1980s in San Diego. My parents gave him our old pots when he started an Afghan restaurant in the area. Later, he opened an Afghan import shop next door to the restaurant and it was a special treat as kids when we would go there and I could pick out some little Afghan trinket in addition to having a delicious meal. A few years ago he moved his restaurant to one of the most posh areas of San Diego and it has been great to watch his success.
On this trip to Afghanistan, unfortunately not a single bite of Afghan food passed our lips. We stayed on the military bases and embassy compound, ate in cafeterias, and the only Afghan we even met with was the Minister of the Interior.
Thus, despite travelling thousands of miles and visiting the country itself, my context and understanding of Afghanistan is pretty much the same as the average American’s-based on the same information that the Obama administration and US military have given us in making their decisions. If I had a few weeks I would love to really try to get to know some Afghans.
Despite our short stay and limited exposure, it was a great opportunity to learn from our generals, NGOs, and diplomatic officials as well as leaders of the Afghan government.
No one has any idea how many people live in Afghanistan. Intelligence estimates range from 22 to 32 million people. There has been no census since 1959. The Ministry of Education has no idea how many kids are in schools. Most likely more than 75 percent of the population is under 30 years old and has only known civil war their entire lives. 25 is considered middle-aged there because the average lifespan is only 46 years. One American soldier charged with working with local groups told me that when he arrived in a remote village he was assumed to be Russian because they hadn’t heard that the Russians had quit Afghanistan (in 1989!). This is the kind of information gap we are talking about.
It is generally believed by us that the Taliban is not popular here. Whatever a poll means in this social context, apparently 80-90 percent of Afghans do not want the return of the Taliban.
President Obama has articulated a clear strategy for our presence in Afghanistan, which has been long awaited and is much appreciated by both the Afghans and our military: “Defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return to either country in the future.”
First of all, I commend Obama for not only articulating a strategy that is both concise and (in my opinion) correct. The reason that we have “chosen” Afghanistan is that it provides sanctuary to those who perpetrated 9/11 and still scheme to do our nation harm. With this new clear mission, however, I fear that our current tactics are not mapped correctly to our strategy.
The first aspect of our new tactics-a diplomatic surge-is indeed well suited to our goals. Not only do we have a senior Special Envoy to the region in the form of Richard Holbrooke, but we have an extremely capable Ambassador in Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, a former 3-star general, and we also have Deputy Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., who himself would be a senior Ambassador at any other post (he recently completed four years as Ambassador in Cairo).
We need all the high-level diplomatic support we can to master the diplomatic complexities of fighting against an enemy holed up in two countries, as well as navigating the complex regional politics. Iran, for instance, a generally a hostile nation that is currently attempting to develop nuclear arms, is helping with redevelopment in western Afghanistan even though we don’t have direct dialog with them regarding it. This is the just the tip of the iceberg of the vast complexities our new diplomatic team will face, and I’m thrilled that we have a top-notch team that is ready and up to the challenge.
The second part of our new tactics-a military surge (more troops)-includes a renewed focus on the building effort. Building wells, schools, and promoting economic development are all nice things, but if the goal is merely to “do good and help people” we could probably bring Africa or Latin America ten times as far along with the same resources than Afghanistan. The real battle in Afghanistan and Pakistan is against Al Qaeda and we should gauge our actions with that in mind.
Our best estimates show there to be no more than 5,000 Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Geographically, they operate out of the Pashtun areas in the south and east of Afghanistan and on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. The Pashtun tribe constitutes about 40 percent of the population of Afghanistan and is the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai is Pashtun, and there is a tradition of Pashtun leadership of the nation. Do we really need to occupy an entire country of around 30 million people to root out 5,000 enemies?
Unlike Iraq, there is no definitive time frame for our operations in Afghanistan to succeed. The general consensus of our military, NGOs, and diplomats is that “our mission” will take at least ten years and but probably more like a generation. Our international coalition is trying to advance Afghanistan from feudalism, through the industrial revolution, and into the information age-in just one generation. That’s a tough challenge even if you’re not battling terrorists at the same time.
I harbor a deep degree of ambivalence about the military surge. The diplomatic surge is good, increasing our covert ops and intelligence abilities focused on Al Qaeda is good, but adding tens of thousands of American troops for years doesn’t necessarily get us closer to defeating Al Qaeda.
I don’t see how the new troop surge follows from Obama’s announced policy. We should engage “the enemy” (Al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts) in the south and east of Afghanistan and the Pakistani border.
The only actual Afghan we spent significant time with was the Secretary of the Interior. He had one fake leg, having lost the other fighting with the Soviets during their occupation of Afghanistan. He was trained in Moscow, married to a Bosnian, and spoke fluent English. Extremely charming, if a little slick, he told us exactly what we want to hear on all counts.
While I was warned not to be biased to like officials just because their English is good and they are charismatic, this minister has received excellent marks so far from the US. He impressed me as a CEO would and sounded like an MBA.
His two biggest challenges are understaffing and
corruption. To put things in perspective, most officers aren’t literate, a requirement to be promoted to Sergeant. It’s hard to imagine police officers who aren’t literate, but that is to be expected in this nation. He told us that the ratio of police in Afghanistan 1.3 per thousand, far less than in major western cities, where it us usually around 4 per thousand. To retain staff, the minister is working on institutional reform and figuring how to better train and pay the police force.
The minister’s other major challenge is corruption. Afghanistan produces a lot of opium, and the money generated from this illicit trade is used to buy politicians and police, as well as fund terrorist organizations. Rather than poppies, the US is trying to get Afghanistan to grow pomegranates (good luck). The minister is focused on building the institution of the police, which is a lot more than just training. Of the three players in Afghan security-the army, the intelligence force, and the police-the minister bemoans the fact that the police are the last to be built up by the allies.
In addition to our briefings from generals in Kandahar and Kabul, we got to spend an hour with troops from our home states in Kabul, and it was fun to visit with four young soldiers-two Air Force, two Army-from Colorado who signed up to meet me. I am happy to report that the troops are well fed, lodging conditions are decent, and safety is pretty good. In fact, one of their biggest complaints is that the military is taking too many precautions about their safety. For instance, one of the soldiers from Colorado trains police officers. He, along with other Americans and members of the international force, mentors Afghan police officers, usually 1 on 1. Mentor and mentee spend all day together, teaching and learning the importance of professionalism, service, and the many skills they need to succeed. This young man was invited by his mentee to dinner to meet his wife and kids. The military prohibits this kind of activity for security reasons, even though it would help build lasting bonds.
While the US government and military leaders have nothing but his safety in mind, I do sympathize with the soldier. I wish that we had more freedom on our Congressional Delegation trip (CODEL) and could have interacted with actual Afghanis, the men and women outside the bases and embassy walls. The only time we even went through the “real Afghanistan” was as we were being ferried between military bases with inches of bullet proof glass separating us from reality. I never even smelled the scents of the stores and shops we passed. I would have gladly taken on a reasonable level of risk to make the overall experience more useful and informative, but was prohibited from doing so. Maybe there is some way to empower individual solders to make these kinds of decisions subject to some ground rules. I would go stir crazy if, like these soldiers, I was living in a place for a year and could never go out and see the real country and get to know the people I’m working with during the day! Surely these kinds of interactions and relationships could further our cause of defeating terrorism.
One final note about our military is that they are an incredible and impressive fighting force. These men and women are consummate professionals and part of an expert military machine; I am amazed anyone would want to go up against our troops. And yet Mulla Omar, Osama Bin Laden, Zakari, and other terrorists are all still at large, along the Pakistani/Afghan border. I’m not sure that our occupation of Afghanistan will help bring them to justice, but our efforts along the Afghan/Pakistani border hopefully will, and I think it’s only a matter of time until we find them and prevent Al Qaeda from taking innocent lives again.
For an on the ground picture Michael Yon moved from Iraq to Afghanistan about a year ago and easily provides the best reporting there.
Two of the big reasons they don’t want troops going out 1 on 1 is kidnapping and women. Having someone killed is part of a war zone but a kidnapped soldier can drive all operations in the country. And a soldier having sex with a woman there can cause a ton of damage.
Kudos for realizing that you’re not really seeing what is going on there. One of the biggest problems in the Vietnam war was there were CODEL trips there and they thought they were getting a real picture.
to reflect on your trip and collect your thoughts.
It is pretty amazing that after all these years of occupation by the Soviets and the US, the Afghan government can’t defend itself against 5,000 fighters with no tanks or planes. It defies reason to think that we will continue to spend our blood and treasure in such an ambiguous situation.
Thanks for taking the time to write such a thoughtful piece. It shows that you are wrestling with this situation also.
.
Since the President and Loya Jirga and Ministries all appear to the local population to be creations of, and dependents of, the US military, is it really accurate to characterize them as the national government ?
Isn’t the actual governance of Afghanistan, the making of decisions and direction of activities, in the hands of Americans ?
Trying to address this from a question of who is actually doing the governing, isn’t it fair to say that the last indigenous “Afghan government” was the Taliban ?
I’m not suggesting that we are wrong to govern the place; somebody needs to. But as long as foreigners are calling the shots, neither Unocal nor its employee “President” Karzai are going to get the “consent of the governed.”
Compare to the situation in Iraq.
Iraqis viewed Nouri al-Maliki as an American toady from the day he was selected by the US in May 2006. The Iraqis had elected Dr. al-Jaafri in December 2005, and US Ambassador Khalilzad would not allow him, or the Iraqi’s’ second choice, al-Mehdi, to take office. The US picked him, even tough he came from a fairly radical Islamist party (“Dawa” means “to answer the call of God,”) specifically because we though him weak and malleable.
But when he signed an agreement with President Bush last year to have ALL US troops before 2012, at the latest, a large number of Iraqis embraced him as their authentic leader. That agreement marked for many the true liberation of Iraq, or at least the beginning of the true liberation, despite the pronouncements of Karl Rove and Karen Hughes.
The government of Iraq led by al-Maliki is now respected, to the extent they are respected, because of their efforts to kick the US occupation out.
There will be a legitimate native government in Afghanistan when they too work to get us out. That should be another of our goals, which supports the al-Qaeda goal – build up a native government strong enough to tell us to leave.
.
but the biggest problem isn’t getting the troops out, it’s finding a way for Afghanistan to fund itself.
The major reason that we have been able to begin transitioning out of Iraq, and Mailiki has been able to move things along at a brisker pace, is that they have oil revenue. They still take a significant amount of American money, and they still rely heavily on U.S. forces for stability, but they can at least start the long road towards true independence.
Afghanistan is so poor that 80% of their money comes from us. I believe that is the reason why we haven’t seen a strong national movement to get rid of American forces there. You’re dead on with the heart of what you’re saying though.
although, as you imply, it is difficult, at best, to formulate any type of policy with so little information.
My opinion, for what it’s worth, is that the Bush strategy, post 911, has been a real disaster on so many levels. The illegal Iraq invasion and occupation, even today, presents a situation as fragile as an Easter egg. Across the Middle East there is a fragility even pirates in row boats are able to exploit. What a disaster!
A comprehensive diplomatic, economic and aid plan will emerge only when individuals like yourself, the public I represent, and the government/military looks hard nosed at the history, the culture, the economies of these countries, and the real stress points of the situation to UNWIND the damage that’s been done. A military presence may be useful in the short run, but is unsustainable over the long run. The sooner we’re able to get our military presence off the streets the better.
Dismantling Al Quaeda must be a police and intelligence effort, not a conventional war.
Keep up the good work in the Congress. Your posts here are appreciated.
.
As we succeed in cleansing the Afghan region of al-Qaeda, do you suppose Osama bin Laden will slink away into a quiet retirement ?
Me neither.
He started his jihadi stuff at home in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Though he is decidedly not a Saudi prince, his Dad’s and Uncle’s business and influence meant that his activities were tolerated for a while.
The morals police had no problems with his movement. But when the security forces started watching his group, and inviting some in to explain their platform, while in “stress positions,” they found the time auspicious for putting their ideas and ideals into practice, helping their Afghan brothers smote the infidel invader. Some branched out to Bosnia, others went to Sudan.
In general, these people gravitate to failing states. And where is the #1 most failing state ? Somalia.
Western analysts would be surprised if al-Qaeda didn’t move it’s “al-qaeda” of operations to Somalia soon. We know they are headed there. We even know who will help unpack their boxes when they arrive.
Wouldn’t this be the best time for the US to take action to make Somalia inhospitable to them ?
In Bosnia, then Iraq, then Afghanistan, we spent boatloads of money to win friends and influence people. It would have been cheaper if we had started each of those efforts by building up trust in the population, but after “shock and awe,” Abu Ghraib and so forth, we made that task very difficult.
We have an opportunity TODAY to build the trust of the Somali people. Most of them believe that the USA paid the Ethiopian Army to invade in December 2006. Most are distrustful of the entire Western world that has alternately exploited and ignored them. We face some significant hurdles.
But the job will be that much tougher if we make our next step the obliteration of their ports, which are essential to trade.
That would feel satisfying, a little payback for the indignity of the capture of an American sea Captain. But it would have no effect on future piracy, other than to escalate the violence and the stakes. And it would make winning hearts and minds more costly.
.
I’ve been thinking of your comments when I’ve seen articles on Somalia.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/…
.
&
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/…
.
and to avoid hijacking a great diary,
I will respond in a diary of my own tonight.
Thanks.
You’ve added some very good content to my tip toing into the Somalia issue. I appreciate it. The world is only as as strong as it’s strongest countries (economically, education, standard of living, social and legal justice systems, etc.) and as weak as it’s weakest countries. This is why I’m watching closely the comprehensive plans of Obama.
What a post!
There’s so much I want to say, but I want to re-read this post a few times, just to make sure I understand things correctly
Nonetheless – Congressman – what a wonderful report! Thank you for taking the time to connect with all of us, the way most other politicians do not
Peace and love – ALI
I’d be curious what the response has been to that, when you’ve asked.
with real insight. Well done.
Your point about being unable to see the real country, engage with its citizens or experience Afghani daily life is a complaint I recall being made about Iraq, from a friend of mine that served there for a year. The problem with this kind of isolation is that it tends to undermine the efforts being made on the ground. While I understand why such security measures were necessary, I fear that in some ways, we are handling the situation in Afghanistan the way we did in Iraq, prior to 2007.
Again, much, much thanks for your updates here. I can’t tell you how much it is appreciated to be able to get at least a glimpse of what is really going on from someone on the inside.
.
There are 10 pay grades for commissioned officers. In the Army, O-1 is Second Lieutenant; O-9 is Lieutenant General; and O-10 is General.
Based on that, I don’t believe the new Ambassador, former Lt. Gen. (O-9) (3-star) Karl W. Eikenberry, Retired, was ever a former 4-star general, O-10.
I don’t mean to nit-pick. This is an excellent post. But this is a glaring, though inconsequential, error.
.
we humble bloggers like to see corrections that increase accuracy no matter how inconsequential they may be.
Being precise and creative is the objective of quality posts regardless of the credentials of the poster.
Good catch.
.
so it was taken as intended, not as critique but as improving accuracy.
In case some wonder about the 5-star rank –
“General of the Army,” held by John J. Pershing, Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradly (maybe others) –
that is no longer in the rank structure.
.
The only 5-stars we have ever had were in WWII – 5 each for the Army & Navy.
You could argue Washington was a General of the Army but they did not have that title then. U.S. Grant held it in the Civil War and I think Pershing in WWI. But they were 4 stars I think.
.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G…
Today, they are equivalent.
But in the period 1866 – 1888, according to Wiki, they weren’t.
This Wiki entry overall seems to support me more than you, but its Wikipedia. What proof is there that I didn’t write this myself, or rewrite it 5 minutes ago ?
……..
I participated in General of the Army Bradley’s internment at Arlington National Cemetery when I was an officer in The Old Guard, so I’m pretty sure he was that rank.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F…
And I know fer sure that he was on active duty at the time of his death as a 5-star general. Personal knowledge that is directly contradicted by the Wiki entry.
Oh, and since I lived on Fort Myer at the time, and the parking spot behind my apartment was adjacent to the post parade field, where I usually commanded the S&T’s, I know that JJ Pershing’s last horse was buried right behind the TUSAB Rehearsal Hall. Blackjack was kind of a big deal at Fort Myer. So I know fer sure that he was called “General of the Armies,” like wiki says.
Until a few minutes ago, when I was rewriting the Wiki entry, I thought that was equivalent to General of the Army, 5-star general, but wiki ambiguously hints it may actually have been considered equivalent to 6 stars. I dunno.
Wiki clarifies that Pershing got his 5th star after WWI, and that Bradley got his after WWII.
I can’t vouch for it, but Wiki says that there were 4 Army 5-stars and 3 Navy 4-stars during WWII.
___________________
looks like you owe me a beer.
And I guess “Tusker” is the “in” brand this week.
When and where is the next CoPols meetup ?
.
I am 99% certain there were 5 Army & 5 Navy 5 stars in WWII. And I am 2,000% sure the number of Army & Navy ones were equal.
On retirement they drop back one rank (to 4 star) except Spruance who only received 4 stars (while Halsey got 5) due to the limit of 5 each – he kept his 4 stars upon retirement.
.
though not infallible,
the US Army Center for Military History
http://www.history.army.mil/fa…
says only 4 Army guys got that rank during the war. Bradley, the 5th and last to get promoted to General of the Army, got his 5th star in 1950.
What looks like a comparable site for the Navy
http://www.history.navy.mil/fa…
says only 4 Navy officers ever got a 5th star, and the last one, Halsey, got it 11 December 1945, which was after the war was over.
…………
not the kind of stuff I want to argue over.
If I’m wrong, the worst of it is I don’t get that beer.
Ever since I learned the secret to Eisenhower’s startling rise through the ranks (not so much talent as the fact that a senior general took him on as a protege,)
I’ve considered promotions at that level to be mostly about politics, not leadership, knowledge or ability.
The worst officer I ever knew, and I knew some bad ones, ended up with 3 stars.
He participated in the 96-hour Persian Gulf War as a battalion commander.
Not that big a challenge when your adversaries are already dead before you cross the FEBA.
But he was in the right place at the right time, and rode that lucky draw to several promotions.
Dave Petraeus got promoted above more able people senior to him because he was willing to do anything to please his President.
Check out the career path of today’s top Army generals. Most served in the White House. Most had tours as propaganda / public affairs officers.
.
I was not aware the 5th came in after the war was over. Is it possible they had a temp promotion before that? (Probably not.)
On Eisenhower I think Marshall’s liking of him was key. But I think Marshall did it for a very good reason. The SCHAEF commander was probably the most political position in the world, even more so than president.
In hindsight Eisenhower was the only one who could have pulled it off. Others might have been better battlefield commanders but that was secondary to keeping the allies fighting together rahter than fighting each other.
.
The diplomatic team is Aces. There’s something I personally don’t like about Ambassador Holbrooke, though I can’t say what. But he has a track record of phenomenal success. I even went to visit the room at Wright Patterson AFB where he hammered out the Dayton Accord, out of respect and awe for what he accomplished.
The military half of the team lacks commensurate stature. Instead of a smart strategist, the Commander of CENTCOM is a partisan politician using the assignment as a platform for a run for elected office.
I hope that weakness is fixed soon.
Ambassador Eikenberry stated during his active duty service that he would not rest until OBL was killed or captured. I think that means that the next language he masters (he’s already fluent in Chinese) will be Somali.
.
I have updated the post to 3-star
Anand Gopal, an Afghan journalist, wrote an excellent piece about women’s rights or lack thereof today in the Huffington Post. Gopal provides an excellent overview on the historical perspective of the reasons why Afghanistan continues to be decades behind in women’s rights.
I appreciate your honest insight on these issues, and you have raised some great questions.
I hesitate to “challenge” you on anything that you’ve said, but I am interested in your perspective on something: You questioned if it was necessary to “occupy” the whole country because the problem seems to be confined to one particular geographical area. But haven’t there been reports of terrorist attacks in other regions of Afghanistan? Or do you feel that if we concentrated our efforts there, the attacks would either stop, or the battle would eventually become limited to the border areas?
Also, what kind of agreement would you like to see (or would we need) in place between the U.S. and Pakistan to effectively prosecute such an operation?
Lastily (and completely unrelated), what are you going to do about the pirates? 🙂
Respectfully,
Haners
There is indeed violence across Afghanistan. All violence is not related to the terrorist threat against our country. There is tribal, sectarian, and simply “gang” violence. Settling century old feuds between tribes, none of whom are involved with Al Queda, is not neccisarily related to fighting terrorism.
So when reading news accounts, it’s important to make an effort to differentiate between the Al Queda terrorists who have attacked us and want to attack us again and regional thugs who engage in violent conflicts within the country but have no connection to international terrorist organizations.
If we concentrate our efforts in the border area, I do not believe attacks would stop elsewhere, but unless those attacks are related to terrorist organizations then it shouldn’t be the top concern we have in the region.
The US and Pakistan work closely together, but the Pakistani security forces are not always reliable in acting on the information we provide. There are factions within their armed forces that are in fact sympathetic to the Taliban. So it’s less a matter of an agreement between the government than it is in helping the Pakistani civilian government exert the chain of command and of course preventing this struggling state from failing.
I haven’t visited the pirates yet, maybe next week. 😉
Congressman Jared Polis
You have the potential to be a great Statesman…a world class Congressman! We here at CoPols just wanna help:-) We absolutely need global thinkers. It’s a small world, and, as you know…it’s all interconnected.
You highlighted a couple of points I hadn’t thought of. Would I be correct in assuming that the U.S. forces currently in Afghanistan are also trying to quel the tribal, sectarian, and gang violence as well? If we do, do you feel that is an appropiate role for the U.S. forces to have, or should we be focusing on the larger mission of defeating terrorism/the Taliban.
Also in your opinion, how much of a danger is there that Pakistan could fail?
Good luck with the pirates, just keep your plane out of range! I can’t believe those idiots are bragging about shooting at a Congressman’s plane-they’re going to attract all of the wrong attention!
Thank you again Congressman. I appreciate your willingness to come here and answer the types of questions we usually wouldn’t be able to ask a Congressman/woman. I hope you enjoy your interactions here as much as we do!